As the Ukrainian Offensive Begins to Culminate Well Short of Its Intended Objectives, Ukrainian Channels have Begun to Analyze Their Failures, and It Provides an Interesting Insight Into the Operational Difficulties the AFU Now Finds Itself In. ZeRada Has This to Say
By Intel Slava Z
As the Ukrainian offensive begins to culminate well short of its intended objectives, Ukrainian channels have begun to analyze their failures and it provides an interesting insight into the operational difficulties the AFU now finds itself in. ZeRada has this to say:
1. Complete absence of surprise effect. The APU went where they were expected. Why the hell did the speakers of the OP announce an offensive there in six months? The question is open.
2. Mistakes in the general planning of the operation. Kharkov relaxed. The command expected that the battle of the Sea of Azov would be the same easy walk. There are no tactical surprises at all‼️
3. Underestimation of the engineer-sapper training of the enemy. Conspiracy theorists even wrote that the Russian Armed Forces carried out mining covertly. This, of course, is nonsense. It’s just that even theoretically SUCH total mining was not calculated, although the Tsar trench was visible even from space.
4. The RF Armed Forces were able to produce and accumulate a sufficient amount of guided weapons, both ground and air-based. The equipment of the Armed Forces of Ukraine that passed the first minefields was met by Kornets and their counterparts.
5. Echeloned EW front cover by the defenders. Combined-arms systems are also operating, and, which was completely unexpected, trench EW of the RF Armed Forces, which were not often seen before. The Armed Forces of Ukraine faced a loss of communication during the offensive, and FPV drones were ineffective.
6. Massive use of guided bombs. Even at the stage of preparing the offensive, the Aerospace Forces knocked out warehouses and accumulations of equipment with UABs and KABs, preventing them from concentrating normally for a full-fledged strike. Residents of Berdyansk and Primorsk say that after the start of the Sushka offensive, they began to fly even more often. The Aerospace Forces do not spare for the key targets of planning bombs.
7. Alligators. Ka-52 are back in the game. Since the beginning of the great war, they have been written off by drone aficionados. But during the offensive, they were able to fully cover their troops, as if in a shooting range, knocking out the armored vehicles of the Armed Forces of Ukraine with impunity. Arestovich’s stories about 6 downed Alligats are not confirmed by anything at all, except for his and Malyar’s statements.
8. Deficiency of air defense. A couple of months before the start of the offensive, the command of the Russian Federation declared the main priority of the radar and air defense systems of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. During this time, they managed to knock out a large number of complexes and their components. Therefore, when the offensive began, the infantry of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, on the contrary, was left without cover. During the Battle of the Sea of Azov, not a single helicopter was shot down.
9. The human factor. One and a half years of war are beginning to affect the quality of personnel. Mariupol and Bakhmut, Lisichansk and Severodonetsk, Marinka and Vuhledar – the Armed Forces of Ukraine have lost a huge number of military personnel, volunteers and ideological fighters. Tankers and attack aircraft, even trained in the West, but consisting of mobilized citizens simply do not want to die. They sometimes break and abandon equipment (as the world press wrote about), refuse to follow orders.
Any subsequent offensive actions of the Armed Forces of Ukraine MUST take into account the above factors. Otherwise, this will continue to be not an offensive, but the destruction of our own troops.
